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RECENT DECISIONS

PATENT-REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY-AssEmEBLAGE OF

OLD PARTS INTO A MACHINE MUST RESULT IN A NEW MODE OF
OPERATION.-The defendant was sued for infringement of a patent.
The patented device was a merchandise handler comprising a threesided sliding rack or frame between guides on a counter. The rack
could be moved between an extension of the counter and the cash
register to transport merchandise within the frame from the extension to a position near the register. The device had achieved
considerable commercial success. It had in fact been used by the
defendant who contended that the patent was invalid. Both the
district court' and the circuit court of appeals,2 bolstered by the
finding of wide commercial success, held that the patent was valid
and infringed, but failed to make a specific finding that the device
was inventive. Held, judgment for plaintiff reversed. While the
device was both new and useful, it lacked invention. Since neither
of the lower courts had specifically found invention to exist, the
Court was not upsetting concurrent findings of fact in the lower
courts.3 Concurring specially, Justices Douglas and Black proposed that nothing be patentable unless it "push back the frontiers
of science"; patents on "gadgets" are not sanctioned under the Constitution. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 71 Sup. Ct. 127 (1950).
The entire field of patent law derives from the constitutional
provision 4 enacted into statute.5 The statutory requirements for
atentability, as judicially interpreted, are four: (1) invention or
dscovery, (2) novelty, (3) usefulness, (4) classification as an art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. The last three of
these permit relatively simple definition. Novelty is determined
essentially by subtracting the substance of prior knowledge in this
country; usefulness has its ordinary meaning in the sense of practicality of purpose. 7 The four categories of inventions are mutually
7Bradley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388 (E. D.
Mich.2 1948).
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 179
F. 2d 636 (6th Cir. 1950).

3 Distinguishing, Graver Tank and Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275 (1949), wherein the Court stated, "A court of
law, such as this Court is, rather than a court for correction of errors in fact
finding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts
below
in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error."
4
U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries...."
5 Principally 46 STAT. 376 (1930) as amended 53 STAT. 1212 (1939), 35
U. S.
6 C. 31 (1946).
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (U. S. 1850). This "doorknob
case" cited by Justice Douglas in the concurring opinion of the principal case
is said to be the first case making this requirement. See Feredico, The Concept of Patentable Inventimon, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 118 (1950).
7 Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U. S. 27 (1921).
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exclusive, 8 and each must concern physical, tangible forces, elements
and results.9
In contrast to an art, manufacture or composition, a machine
has three distinctive characteristics. It has more than one part or
element; at least one of the parts moves relative to the remainder;
the movable parts act in some definite, repetitive fashion.10 Each
of the elements must be necessary to the unit which in turn must
"answer a single purpose." "1
Invention or discovery' 2 is found from the degree of the advance over prior knowledge. It is not sufficient to find novelty;
the trier of fact '3 must measure the novel features against the "standard of invention" and from the comparison determine whether invention exists. When applied to a machine, it is not required that
the elements themselves be inventive, or even new; rather, the combination of the elements, looking at all its parts as a unit, must be
inventive.' 4 It must be more than a new assemblage of the old
parts; '5 the assemblage must result in a new mode of operation.' 6
When invention is reasonably in doubt, the court may give weight
to its commercial success, but doubt there must be.' 7 Procedurally,
concurrent findings of the lower courts that invention exists are accepted by the Supreme Court unless clear error is shown.' 8
The abstract idea of invention has never been, and probably
never will be, accurately formulated in words. "More than ordinary
mechanical skill" ' 9 may be required or "inventive genius", 20 or "ins Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366 (1909) (by implication);
Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252 (U. S. 1853) (by implication).
9
For example, the following are not patentable: natural principles,
DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U. S. 664, 685 (1931) ; business methods, United States Credit System v. American Credit Indemnity Co.,
51 Fed. 751 (C.C. N. D. Ill. 1892) ; processes involving mental acts, Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F. 2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 326

U. S.696 (1945).

10 See Henry, Standards of Invention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J.PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 97, 101 (1950).
11 Sachs v. Hartford Electric Supply Co., 47 F. 2d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 283 U. S.854 (1931).
12 These are synonyms in patent law. 1 WALKEa ON PATENTS 35-38 (Deller's
ed. 1937).
'3 Invention is a fact. Graver Tank and Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 336 U. S.271 (1949) ; Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 265 U. S.445 (1923).

14Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts Manufacturing Co., 307
U. S. 350 (1939); Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303
U. S.545, 549 (1938).
15 Cf. Adams v. Bellaire Stamping Co., 141 U. S.539 (1891).
16 Cf. Florsheim v. Schilling, 137 U. S.64 (1890); Burt v. Evory, 133
U. S.349 (1890).
17 Cf. jungersen v. Ostby and Barton Co., 335 U. S. 560 (1949).
"sGraver Tank and Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336
U. S.271 (1949) ; cf. Tyng v. Grinnell, 92 U. S.467 (1875). FED. R. Civ. P.

52(a).
19 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S.419, 427 (1891).
20 Mantle Lamp Co. v. Aluminum Products Co., 301 U. S.544, 546 (1937).
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tuitive genius" 21 or "the flash of creative genius." 22 Probably the
most descriptive is the test suggested by Justice L. Hand, that of
"creative imagination." 23 The application of such an abstract, "willo'-the-wisp" 24 standard, a process not unique to patent law, necessarily responds to shifting social forces and their impact on judges'
propensities. 25 Today Edison's electric light patent, Bell's telephone
patent, Nikola Tesla's electric motor
patent and others of similar
26
importance might well be invalid.
The difficulty is apparent in the present case. The trial court 27
held the
patent valid because it had seen a "flash of creative genius." 28 The concurring opinion in the Supreme Court 2 9 found the
patent invalid under the same standard.
The standard proposed in the concurring opinion is believed to
be too stringent. The constitutional provision is not limited to the
promotion of science; the encouragement of the useful arts is expressly intended. The concurring opinion illustrates one of the great
delusions of our time--the confusion of science with technology.
Science by itself seldom yields inventions; it is concerned with facts,
not with human needs.30 Industry advances through the work of
its technologists, the men who design and improve the gadgets
frowned upon.
Unquestionably, the patent at issue was invalid. Regardless of
its commercial success, novelty and utility, the device was not invention by the meagerest standard. It was not more than an assemblage of old parts, each operating in its same old way to produce a
very obvious and ancient result-moving goods along a counter to
a cashier. But the problem before the Court remains to be answered
-some permanent measurable standard of invention.
Certainly, more should be required than was accepted in the
present case by the Patent Office and the two lower courts. The
Potts and Co. v. Creager, 155 U. S. 597, 607 (1895).
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84, 91
(1941).
23 Jungersen v. Baden, 166 F. 2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissent). Justice
Frankfurter's dissent on appeal quoted Justice Hand's dissenting circuit court
opinion in Jungersen v. Ostby and Barton Co., 335 U. S. 560, 568 (1949).
24 L. Hand, J., in Sachs v. Hartford Electric Supply Co., 47 F. 2d 743, 748
(2d Cir. 1931).
25 See Broder, Trends in Patent Law, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 936 (1950);
see also Henry, Standards of Invention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J.PAT. OFF.
Soc'v
97 (1950).
2
0Dodds and Crotty, "The New Doctrinal Trend," 30 J.PAT. OF'. So'y
83 27
(1948).
Bradley v.Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388, 392 (E.D.
Mich. 1948).
28 Cuno Engineering Corp. v.Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S.84, 91
(1941).
29Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 71
Sup. 0Ct. 127, 131 (1950).
3 See Sachs v. Hartford Electric Supply Co., 47 F. 2d 743, 748 (2d Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S.854 (1931).
21
22
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present decision should have, and already has had,3 ' that effect. Perhaps the cure
lies in Congressional enactment of a permanent meas82
uring rod.

PRACTICE AND PLEADING-APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 23 OF
THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT-CHANGE OF PARTIES.-In 1946 plaintiff

brought suit against PRC Pictures. The contracts upon which the

complaint relied contained a nine-month period of limitation within
which an action must be commenced on a claim arising under the
contracts. Because of the failure of the plaintiff's president to obey
court orders for examination before trial, plaintiff's action was dismissed on the merits.' On appeal the judgment was affirmed but
modified to provide for dismissal not upon the merits. 2 Plaintiff
then commenced a new action, after the time limited in the contracts
but within one year after dismissal, against Pathe Industries, who in
the meantime had acquired all the assets of the dissolved PRC, including the subject matter of the dismissed suit. The district court
held the claim barred by the nine-month period of limitation.3 Held,
reversed. The suit was timely brought within the meaning of Section
23 of the New York Civil Practice Act.4 The fact that defendant
was not a party to the earlier suit is not controlling. Where the
parties to the second suit are identical in interest with the parties to
the first, Section 23 applies. ProducersReleasing Corp. De Cuba v.
Pathe Industries,Inc., 184 F. 2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
s 1 See, e.g., Paramount Industries, Inc. v. Solar Products Corp., 88 U. S.
Patent Quarterly 233 (2d Cir. 1951); Vapor Blast Manufacturing Co. v.
Pangborn Corp., 186 F. Zd 230 (4th Cir. 1950); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.

Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 94 F. Supp. 938 (D. C. Md. 1951).
82 See Henry, Standards of Invention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J. PAT. OFF.
Socdy 97 (1950).
1 Cf. Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, Inc., 8 F. R. D.
254 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
2 Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, Inc., 176 F. 2d 93
(2d Cir. 1949).
3 Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. Pathe Industries, Inc., 10 F. R. D.
29 (S. D. N. Y. 1950) (the court held that the dismissal of the original suit
had been for neglect to prosecute).
4N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 23 provides: "If an action is commenced within
the time limited therefor, and a judgment therein is reversed on appeal without
awarding a new trial, or the action is terminated in any other manner than by
a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff, or, if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representative, may commence a new
action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within
one year after such a reversal or termination."
Section 23 applies to limitations by statute or contract. Littrell v. Allemania
Fire Ins. Co., 224 App. Div. 523, 231 N. Y. Supp. 520 (3d Dep't 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 250 N. Y. 628, 166 N. E. 350 (1929).

